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11                                Abstract 
13 
14                                Laura Odwazny and Benjamin Berkman have raised several challenges regarding the new 
15 
16                                reasonable person standard in the revised Common Rule, which states that informed 
18 
19                                consent requires potential research subjects be provided with information a reasonable 
20 
21                                person would want to know to make an informed decision on whether to participation in 
22 
23                                a study. Our aim is to offer a response to the challenges Odwazny and Berkman’s raise, 24 
25 
26                                which include the need for a reasonable person standard that can be applied consistently 
27 
28                                across IRBs and that doesn’t stigmatize marginal groups. In response, we argue that the 
29 
30                                standard ought to be based in an Ordinary rather than Ideal Person conception of 
31 
32 
33                                reasonable person and that the standard ought to employ what we call a Liberal 
34 
35                                Constraint: the reasonability standard must be malleable enough such that a wide variety 
36 
37                                of individuals with different, unique value systems would endorse it.   We conclude by 
38 




49                                Introduction 
51 
52                                                The revised Common Rule includes a new provision requiring that prospective 
53 
5                                


















3                                  information that a reasonable person would want to have in order to make an informed 
4 
5                                  
decision about whether to participate” in research. 1  In a recent paper, Laura Odwazny 
7 
8                                  and Benjamin Berkman raise several challenges about how to understand this new 
9 
10                                reasonable person standard.2  Here, we will discuss Odwazny and Berkman’s challenges 
11 
12                                before attempting to gesture towards a response. Our response provides several necessary 13 
14 
15                                conditions placed on the reasonable person standard.  It is not meant to account for all 
16 
17                                necessary, let alone sufficient, conditions. We conclude by suggesting some of the likely 
18 
19                                consequences our view would have, if adopted. 20 
21 
22                                                We should note that while the revised rule is part of US federal law, our view is 
23 
24                                likely to interest non-American readers. As we argue in the closing section, this is 
25 
26                                because implementing our view would help yield more credible research results, which 
27 
28                                
should interest Americans and non-Americans alike. 
30 
31 
32                                Section One 
33 
34 
35                                                Reasonable person standards have long been prominent features of the U.S. 
36 
37                                judicial system, and indeed are already referenced in the previous version of the Common 
38 
39                                Rule. But the older references to reasonability implicitly concern institutional review 
41 
42                                board (IRB) committee members or researchers (e.g., a reasonable risk/benefit ratio), not 
43 




48                                1  Code of Federal Regulations. (2017) Federal Register Volume 82, Number 12. Title 45, 
49 
50                                Part 46. U.S. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects. 51 
52                                2  Odwazny, Laura M., & Benjamin E. Berkman. (2017). The ‘Reasonable Person’ 
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3                                  experience with the current Common Rule reasonableness assessments will not be clearly 
4 
5                                  
translatable to application of a reasonable person disclosure for informed consent.”3 
7 
8                                                   A related challenge concerns implementing the new reasonable person standard. 
9 
10                                Unlike a jury system – which employs the reasonableness standard within certain 
11 
12                                constraints, such as judicial precedent that allows for a shared understanding of the 13 
14 
15                                reasonable person in a given case – IRBs don’t share previous decisions with one 
16 
17                                another. This means that each IRB is free to determine the reasonable person standard for 
18 
19                                themselves. Thus, not only will the standard fail to be consistently applied, the standard is 20 
21                                
unlikely to meaningfully exist in the first place.4 
23 
24                                                Another concern is that the new reasonability requirement will work to convey 
25 
26                                negative social statements towards marginalized groups.  As Odwazny and Berkman put 
27 
28                                
it: “It could send an unintentionally pejorative message to groups with nonstandard 
30 
31                                views.”5   For instance, if a minority group wishes to protect its members by asking for 
32 
33                                more detailed than average disclosures in the informed consent process, the minority 
34 
35                                group could be deemed unreasonable, a designation that is likely to further stigmatize the 36 
37 
38                                group. 
39 
40                                                Finally, Odwazny and Berkman ask who will be responsible for evaluating 
41 
42                                whether the reasonable person standard has been met. Since IRBs are typically composed 43 
44 
45                                of highly educated persons like researchers, it’s not obvious that IRBs are best suited to 
46 
47                                perform this evaluation. Instead of entire IRBs, Odwazny and Berkman raise the 
48 
49 
50                                3  Odwazny & Berkman, op. cit. note. 2, p. 50. 51 





















3                                  possibility of singular IRBs’ community members serving as the evaluators, but they 
4 
5                                  
worry that “placing that responsibility on a single person (who might or might not have 
7 
8                                  actual experience relevant to the research under review) increases the chances of the 
9 




14                                Section Two 
15 
16                                                In this section, we respond to Odwazny and Berkman’s challenges. To begin, it is 
18 
19                                worth mentioning that Odwazny and Berkman’s first two concerns are related. Indeed, 
20 
21                                consistency is all the more difficult to realize (the second challenge) since previous 
22 
23                                reasonableness assessments are not translatable to the new reasonable person standard 24 
25 
26                                (the first challenge). 
27 
28                                                To address these two challenges, any plausible reasonability standard for research 
29 
30                                subjects must be substantive enough to be consistently applied across IRBs. To help 
31 
32 
33                                ensure that the new reasonability requirement is sufficiently substantive, it is first 
34 
35                                necessary to distinguish between two different conceptions of reasonability. According to 
36 
37                                the Ideal Conception of reasonability, what is reasonable is determined by reference to 
38 
39                                the ideal person. Presumably, this person would be maximally prudent (i.e., rational) and 
41 
42                                virtuous (i.e., able to maximally follow moral imperatives). By contrast, according to the 
43 

























3                                  the behavior or perspective of ordinary persons, i.e, to persons with typical prudential and 
4 
5                                  
moral limitations.7 
7 
8                                                  We think the Ordinary Person conception of reasonability is preferable. To see 
9 
10                                why though, we must first reply to Odwazny and Berkman’s challenge concerning 
11 
12                                marginalization. Recall that for Odwazny and Berkman, the new reasonability 13 
14 
15                                requirement is likely to further increase marginalization, at least for certain already 
16 
17                                stigmatized groups since the new requirement may lead IRBs to characterize these groups 
18 
19                                as unreasonable. To address this worry, we propose what we call the liberal constraint: 20 
21 
22                                the reasonability standard must be malleable enough such that a wide variety of 
23 
24                                individuals with different, unique value systems would endorse it. This constraint is 
25 
26                                liberal in the sense that it functions to accommodate divergent conceptions of the good 
27 
28                                
life. Obviously, some groups – like radical scientific skeptics – nevertheless may still be 
30 
31                                deemed unreasonable even according to the liberal constraint.8  But in practice we think it 
32 
33 
34                                7  See Collins, Ronald KL. (1976). Language, History and the Legal Process: A profile of 
35 
36                                
the Reasonable Man. Rutgers-Cam LJ 8:311; Reynolds Jr, Osborne M. (1970). The 
38 
39                                Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the Odious Creature. Oklahoma 
40 
41                                Law Review. 23: 410; and Scalet, Steven P. (2003). Fitting the People they are Meant to 
42 
43                                Serve: Reasonable Persons in the American Legal System. Law & Philosophy 22 (1) 44 
45 
46                                (01): 75-110. for a discussion of these two conceptions. 
47 
48                                8  The liberal constraint, as we imagine it, is not completely analogous to the Rawlsian 
49 
50                                idea that reasonable persons must endorse moral pluralism, the burdens of judgment, and 51 
52 
53                                the like. Our liberal constraint clearly draws upon Rawls’s idea of reasonability, but is 
54 
















3                                  will be far easier to meet the liberal constraint in most circumstances, since most people 
4 
5                                  
accept basic rules of inference and basic moral norms, such as anti-discrimination norms, 
7 
8                                  and the obligations to respect autonomy and promote well-being. 
9 
10                                                The liberal constraint recommends the Ordinary Person conception of 
11 
12                                reasonability over the Ideal conception. This is because it provides a reason to prefer the 13 
14 
15                                Ordinary Person conception insofar as persons with different life plans are far more likely 
16 
17                                to converge on an interpretation of the Ordinary Person conception. This is the case 
18 
19                                because the Ideal Person conception does not lend itself to the liberal constraint, for 20 
21 
22                                whatever counts as ideal, under the Ideal conception, will likely rely heavily on values 
23 
24                                and principles that many reject.  Part of the worry here is that an Ideal conception would 
25 
26                                import the particular value system and form of the good life held by those developing the 
27 
28                                
ideal. This is not so with the Ordinary Person conception. Indeed, most of us think that 
30 
31                                ordinary people are marked by their common properties, like common intelligence and 
32 
33                                the fact that they do not all agree about what the true or correct life plan is. Thus, the 
34 
35                                liberal constraint supports the Ordinary Person conception of reasonability.  We are now 36 
37 
38                                in a position to consider what a substantive conception of the reasonable person would 
39 













53                                division of labor between their public and private moralities, let alone require them to 
54 

















3                                                  Any reasonable person standard should include a description of rational and moral 
4 
5                                  
capacities.9  Given our Ordinary Person conception, we suggest that characteristics of 
7 
8                                  rational capacity relative to the context of research subjects are given by generic 
9 
10                                standards of decision-making competency.  These include the following abilities: ability 
11 
12                                to evidence choice, ability to understand relevant information, ability to appreciate the 13 
14 
15                                situation and its likely consequences, and the ability to manipulate information 
16 
17                                rationally.10  Relevant characteristics of moral capacity include – but are not limited to – 
18 
19                                having a set of reasonable ethical values that inform one’s life plan as well as the desire 20 
21                                





27                                9  See Sibley,W.M. (1953). The Rational versus the Reasonable. The Philosophical 28 
29 
30                                Review (4): 554; and Rawls, John. (1999). Collected Papers Harvard University Press, 
31 
32                                pg. 445 
33 
34                                10  See Appelbaum, Paul S., & Thomas Grisson. (1988). Assessing Patients' Capacities to 
35 
36                                
Consent to Treatment. The New England Journal of Medicine (25): 1635; and Leo, 
38 
39                                Raphael J. (1999). Competency and the Capacity to Make Treatment Decisions: A Primer 
40 
41                                for Primary Care Physicians. Primary Care Companion to the Journal of Clinical 
42 
43                                Psychiatry 1 (5) (10): 131-41. 44 
45 
46                                
11  Note, even though we agree with the requirement that subjects be provided with 
47 
48                                information that a reasonable person would wish to know, it does not follow that 
49 
50                                unreasonable subjects should be excluded from research, for the role of the reasonable 51 
52 
53                                person standard principally functions as a model of what information to provide subjects. 
54 
















3                                                  Moreover, since group identity is partially constituted by a set of values, these 
4 
5                                  
value sets will differ among subjects belonging to various groups.  The Liberal Constraint 
7 
8                                  accommodates this fact and recommends that information be provided that the subject 
9 
10                                would deem particularly significant considering her value set and would be expected to 
11 
12                                influence her decision on whether to participate in the study.  Thus, information that 13 
14 
15                                ought to be provided may differ between subjects depending on what they deem 
16 
17                                significant.  As T. M. Wilkinson notes, information regarding the researcher’s views and 
18 
19                                sponsors may be relevant in this regard.12   For example, it would be expected that a 20 
21 
22                                Jewish subject would want to know if the researcher or sponsors hold anti-Semitic views. 
23 
24                                                One worry here is that not all such relevant information should be provided.  For 
25 
26                                example, a staunch supporter of a political party may want to know if the researcher is a 
27 
28                                
member of an opposing party. While this information may influence the subject’s 
30 
31                                decision and is significant regarding her values, disclosing it would be unjustified. 
32 
33                                Providing a full account of how to judge which information would be inappropriate to 
34 
35                                disclose is beyond the scope of this paper.13  But as a preliminary response: The point of 36 
37 
38                                informed consent is to respect a subject’s autonomy, but there are other important values 
39 
40                                that ought to be balanced with autonomy, such as privacy and fairness.  In cases like our 
41 
42                                staunch supporter, the researcher’s privacy clearly outweighs the value of the subject’s 43 
44 
45                                autonomy.  Keeping the balance of values in mind helps to adjudicate between 
46 
47                                appropriate and inappropriate disclosures of information. 
48 
49 
50                                12 Wilkinson, T.M. (2001). Research, Informed Consent, and the Limits of Disclosure. 51 
52 
53                                Bioethics 15 (4)(08): 341-63 pg. 346 
54 
















3                                                  To reiterate: our view is that because specifying a conception of the reasonable 
4 
5                                  
person requires both generic and non-generic elements, there can be multiple reasonable 
7 
8                                  standards, each indexed to particular, socially salient groups. But what if a minority of 
9 
10                                members within a group desires to know information that the majority would rather 
11 
12                                remain free of knowing? Is providing this information reasonable or not? And if it is 13 
14 
15                                reasonable, is it reasonable to also inform the majority against their wishes? 
16 
17                                                To answer these questions, it is helpful to focus on the example of cochlear 
18 
19                                implants for deaf persons. Assume that most deaf persons, like the majority of non-deaf 20 
21 
22                                persons, view deafness as pathological. Moreover, assume that the majority of deaf 
23 
24                                persons would prefer to forgo hearing testimony during the informed consent process 
25 
26                                from deaf persons who reject the notion that deafness is pathological. Nevertheless, 
27 
28                                
following Lauren Pass and Abraham Graber, we think the reasonable person (here 
30 
31                                indexed to deaf persons) “would attach significance to the fact than many of those who 
32 
33                                best understand what it is like to be deaf view deafness not as harm, but rather as an 
34 
35                                integral aspect of their identity.”14  Therefore, on our view, not only would it be required 36 
37 
38                                to inform the minority who wish access to this information, it would be incumbent to 
39 
40                                inform the majority who wish to remain ignorant as well. Reasonableness would demand 
41 
42                                it, and it would demand it based on the epistemic merit of persons most intimately 43 
44 
45                                familiar with deafness who also reject the commonly accepted pathological view.  Our 
46 
47 
48                                14 Pass, Lauren and Abraham Graber. (2015). Informed Consent, Deaf Culture, and 
49 
50                                Cochlear Implants.  The Journal of Clinical Ethics (26): 219-30. Note, Pass and Graber’s 
51 
52 
53                                discussion of cochlear implants concerns the clinical setting, but we believe their 
54 
















3                                  point here generalizes: if the minority of a socially salient group wishes to know or not 
4 
5                                  
know something, then, depending on the relevant reasons in favor of their request, they, 
7 
8                                  along with the majority, should be granted access to this information. 
9 
10                                                To close this section, we’ll examine how our view addresses the concern about 
11 
12                                who will ensure that the reasonable person standard is met. Again, recall Odwazny and 13 
14 
15                                Berkman’s worry: IRBs as a whole are not the best judges, since their makeup will likely 
16 
17                                be quite different from the Ordinary Person, and community members are unlikely to 
18 
19                                have the research experience needed to enable them to provide the relevant information 20 
21 
22                                an Ordinary Person would want in a principled manner. 
23 
24                                                In reply, we think that Odwazny and Berkman’s skepticism about IRBs as a 
25 
26                                whole is well warranted, for exactly the reason they describe. But we are more optimistic 
27 
28                                
about giving community members the most responsibility to ensure the reasonable person 
30 
31                                standard is met.15  And this should come as no surprise, given our view of reasonability: 
32 
33                                Because the Ordinary Person standard directs our attention to ordinary, non-expert 
34 
35                                people, community members – as non-research specialists – are best suited to ensure 36 
37 
38                                ordinary persons’ informed decision-making needs. 16  Moreover, were our view adopted 
39 
40 
41                                15  We say the most responsibility because IRBs can and should have some responsibility 
42 
43                                to ensure the standard is met. 44 
45 
46                                16 An anonymous reviewer expressed the worry that community representatives may not 
47 
48                                always be able to identify the reasonable views of a small minority of a socially salient 
49 
50                                community, especially if there is wide disagreement among the community about what 51 
52 
53                                information should be provided. A full account of how best to implement our view is 
54 

















3                                  by IRBs and especially by IRBs’ community members, it would provide some principled 
4 
5                                  
guidance about the reasonable person’s content. This guidance would reduce the risk of 
7 
8                                  community members’ undue idiosyncratic influence. 
9 
10 
11                                Section Three 
13 
14                                                It is finally worth asking what the likely practical consequences of our Ordinary 
15 
16                                Person conception would be, if adopted by a majority of IRBs. First, unless a majority of 
18 
19                                IRBs have some mechanism in place to share how they actually implement this standard 
20 
21                                in particular studies, the standard is unlikely to have much impact at all. But there is 
22 
23                                reason for optimism here, since the single IRB requirement – the mandate that all NIH- 24 
25 
26                                funded studies must rely on a single IRB of record – is another component of the new 
27 
28                                Common Rule. And this centralization of the IRB process provides the impetus for the 
29 
30                                NIH to distribute informed consent documents and informed consent guidelines across at 
31 
32 
33                                least the IRBs overseeing NIH-funded studies. 
34 
35                                                Second, IRBs that adopt our preferred Ordinary Person conception of 
36 




41                                participants be given the opportunity to request further information after they’ve received 
42 
43                                what the IRB determines is reasonable information. The IRB may decide there are 44 
45 
46                                reasons to reject the request for additional information, but they have the responsibility, 
47 
48                                particularly the community member, to take the request seriously and to provide reasons 
49 
50                                to the minority justifying the IRB’s rejection. This would surely go some way towards 51 
52 
53                                ensuring that the small minority, whose views and values may not be represented, is 
54 


















3                                  comprehension over the Ideal Conception. Indeed, facilitating subject comprehension is 
4 
5                                  
one of the principal aims explicitly outlined in the Notice of Proposed Rule Making that 
7 
8                                  Health and Human Services cited for the new reasonability standard.17  Our interpretation 
9 
10                                of the reasonable person standard seems better suited to achieve this aim by directing 
11 
12                                IRBs to consider subjects as they are, not as they ideally should be. 13 
14 
15                                                Finally, implementing our view of reasonability is likely to make for better, more 
16 
17                                informative studies. This is because adequately informed subjects – especially in light of 
18 
19                                their values – are more likely, all else being equal, to have positive experiences 20 
21 
22                                participating in research, encouraging broader support for research participation. 
23 
24                                Ultimately, more research participants will yield more credible research results, 
25 
26                                something everyone has a strong interest in promoting.  Thus, although the revised 
27 
28                                
Common Rule is part of US law, our view is nevertheless relevant to non-American 
30 
31                                readers, since all countries have an interest promoting strong scientific research. 
32 
33 
34                                Conclusion 
36 
37                                                Odwazny and Berkman identify important concerns regarding the new Common 
38 
39                                Rule’s reasonability standard. In this paper, we address those concerns by sketching what 
41 
42                                this standard ought to look like.  Here, we suggest that the standard ought to employ a 
43 






50                                17  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Revisions to the Common Rule. (2015). Federal 51 
52 
53                                Register Volume 80, Number 173. Retrieved March,22, 2018 from 
54 















3                                  by discussing what the likely consequences of our preferred interpretation of the standard 
4 
5                                  
would be, which include promoting subject comprehension and more informative studies. 
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